開工大吉 – 中共與港資孽緣之始;香港係中國離岸金融重地

好!終於到我有間寫呢篇算係遲交咗嘅嘢⋯⋯!!

“Evaluate the social and political impacts of economic integration between Hong Kong and China.”

  • *Fong, Brian Chi-hang. (2014)The Partnership between the Chinese Government and Hong Kong’s Capitalist Class: Implications for HKSAR Governance, 1997–2012.” The China Quarterly 217: 195–220.
  • Hung, Ho-fung. (2019) Chinese State Capitalism in Hong Kong” in Lui Tai-lok, Chiu Stephen W.K. & Ray Yep (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Hong Kong. Oxon; New York: Routledge.
  • Hung, Ho-fung & Ip, Iam-chong. (2012) “Hong Kong’s Democratic Movement and the Making of China’s Offshore Civil Society.” Asian Survey 52(3): 504–527. 

Before I start .. just wanna say it has been a tiring week for no apparent reason. So tired…

*

頭兩篇文都有啲驚喜,in the sense that佢地又真係講咗啲聽咗中港關係的政治經濟學一段時間嘅我,一路都無咩睇到有系統性研究嘅一啲重要嘅gap,兩樣都幾重要。一係香港的商界點建制法,知就知個廊(功能組別呀、反送中會出黎要求修例呀),但係具體真係完全不清晰。二係香港呢個離岸貿易及金融中心對於中國經濟的重要性,尤其是中共保持不完全對外開放的金融(企圖將香港打造成離岸人民幣「批發」中心),對於用「攬炒」威脅中共都有一些參考作用。兩樣對於我來講,都係一個可以連結當前的政治風頭,再轉去深化同探討資本主義視角下中港的經濟關係的一啲好嘅開端。最後一篇講香港係中國公民社會的離岸資源流通地,篇野前半就悶啲(又係講03-2010堆香港抗爭),後半講大陸的運動如何受香港影響,都係中港關係嘅另一個重要面向嚟嘅。

最近come across一句野:”Nothing has really happened until it has been described.” 一路以來,我都未係好明學術呢個範疇其實係可以點contribute to immediate needs,正所謂遠水不能夠近火。不過有呢句野之後,好似個人安心咗啲,肯定返研究、閱讀、書寫、紀錄的角色,就是讓已發生的事情「真正地發生一次」,成為一個可供後來的行動者或紀錄者立足的視點。有朋友話,為了培養耐性,我係應該睇少啲設計出黎就係為了讓人在最最最短時間之內,吸收最大量最重要的訊息的journal article,而應該睇多啲書,仲要係同平時睇開那些有些不同種類的書(可能係小說?).唉我以前中學都有追過下小說,不過不太容易⋯⋯仲要依家成日覺得應該睇一啲同勞工呀、Econ呀相關的書。不過個「應該」都已經長期搞到我透不過氣來。如果可以真係鬆一鬆,唔洗好似(依家)趕住去投胎咁larp下一堆文,咁就好喇。

Anyways. 印象中,方志恆篇文係講香港商界同中共的共謀關係,全文分為幾個部份,首先講呢段孽緣嘅起源,之後講港資如何從制度化的渠道、中聯辦的統戰及中港經濟融合上,得到可以踰越香港政府的政治權力。之後,再講英國、中國為主權國家時,兩者建立政治聯盟的不同手法與作用,最後係睇返當時的2012年唐英年對梁振英的選舉,到底有無反映到港資政治地位嘅沒落。

中英談判及回歸前期,中共無論在需要挽留隨英資撤資潮而漸趨不穩的本地資本、需要香港資金幫國內改革開放起錨、定係要止住氣勢如虹的民主派,都十分自然地需要籠絡香港的資本家。而呢班獻世派亦都希望在香港的政制轉型期間,穩住商界原有的低稅率、無基本工資等優勢,同時都需要歇制相對親基層的民主派,因此選擇離開與港英的結盟,策略性地轉投中共的政治附庸網絡之中。

統戰的工作喺過渡期早早展開,一眾的商界大亨被納入不同的行政機構:基本法起草委員會(the Basic Law Drafting Committee)、基本法諮詢委員會(the Basic Law Consultative Committee)、港事顧問(Hong Kong Affairs Advisers)、香港特別行政區籌備委員會(Preparatory Committee for the HKSAR)、預備工作委員會(Preliminary Working Committee of the )。另外,當然仲有今日常見的政治酬庸崗位:全國人民代表大會(Representatives of the Hong Kong’s compatriots to the National People’s Congress)、中國人民政治協商會議(Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference,即政協)的香港同胞代表。

(屌,諗到有班人一車一車咁送同齡人返大陸毒打,我就覺得香港「同胞」呢個稱呼真係next level骨痹 >< !中國真係好double speak同好法西斯(專制極端民族主義)!!!!)

方志恆的一個重要論點,係相對當時幾hands-off、容許港督作出平衡階級利益之決定以穩定政權合法性的英國政府,手握香港主權嘅中共為香港嘅資本家提供了直通天庭的溝通渠道,令到港府作為地方管治者的自主性(autonomy)大大削弱,2 player game to 3 players game – circumvention 階級關係日漸失衡。商界首先已被安插在種種的行政架構之中,1998-2012年香港人大、政協成員分別有平均43.7%及70.8%係商界人士,而呢班人喺每年第一季,人大、政協全國兩會在北京周年會面期間,香港代表都會留多成兩個禮拜,開一個叫「兩會」嘅野,香港商界直接面見北京官員傾計。

其次,按中共的層級架構,負責港澳問題的最高級別負責部門是「中央港澳工作協調小組」(Central Coordination Group for Hong Kong and Macau Affairs),由中共中央、國務院等多個部門的負責人組成,目前的組長是韓正(2018年4月—,中共中央政治局常委、國務院副總理)。支援協調小組有四個主要部門:

  • 國務院港澳事務辦公室(港澳辦,Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office,主任為張曉明,負責協助國務院辦理港澳事務);
  • 中央人民政府駐香港特別行政區聯絡辦公室(中聯辦,the Liaison Office,主任為王志民,是國務院在港的派出機構);
  • 國外交部駐香港特別行政區特派員公署(Office of the Commissioner of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC in the HKSAR,特派員為謝鋒,負責處理香港與外國政府和國際組織之間的外交事務);
  • 中國人民解放軍駐香港部隊(People’s Liberation Army Hong Kong Garrison,國務派駐香港負責防務的國家武裝力量)

當中,以中聯辦的統戰角色最為重要。於2000年前,它的前身為香港新華社(Xinhua Hong Kong),以往組織了大批的左派商業、教育、旅遊機構,及群眾組織如工會、地方社堂、老人及婦女組織等。近年由中聯辦籌劃的國慶籌委會(Presidium of the preparatory committee of HK compatriots in Celebraton of the Founding Anniversary of the PRC)都係有過五成成員來自商界。

**

之後果啲已經係同時間比賽(趕交貨),可以唔洗理,存照,得閑再擴寫,sorry

  • CEPA – China as largest investor in hk; mainland as principal investment srea by HKers (pic: convergence; largest hk conglo. holdings in mainland)
  • HK business needed relations to overcome bureaucratic hurdles by provincial govts -> senior CCP

Hung (2019):

Chinese capitalism needed HK as springboard

  • Onset of Chinese economic revolution: early 1980s decollectivisation in rural areas & decentralisation – regional govt seek transnational capital attracted to unlimited supply of low-wage labour
  • late 1980s SOE reform (cut perm jobs), dual track system (rise of cadre-capitalist calss) – 1989 unrest, end pol reform and yes neoliberalisation
  • 1990s further SOE reforms by ‘insider privatisation’, rise of export-oriented manufacturing ;- importance of East Asian FDI

Rise of role of export

  • 2000s: WTO, RMB devaluation in 1994
  • trade surplus – liquidity – allow for foreign reserves to back up RMB , deployed in bank loans to finance fixed-asset investment in SOEs & local gots- mode: EX, fixed-asset investment, low-wage regime
  • EX as mother of cap boom

HK’s importance: early inclusion in trade order help FDI transder; SOE come to HK got stock market to raise capital

  • 1992 US-HK Policy Act passed – regularly monitor hk autonomy, continue treat hk as separate territory in econ n trade matters (IM quotas, cert of origin) – grant most-favored-nation status in hk products, support access of sensitive tech – important before china joined WTO in 2001
  • China today: 1) import goods subject to quota through hk; 2) register capital at hk to make foreign acquisitions e.g. Ukrainian aircraft, Nicaragua canal project (export cap to HK for re-export, see table 24.1); 3) Use HK’s court system as international arbitration center ; 4) rely on HK’s own currency n fin system

Chinese companies

  • In colonial times, only state companies like Bank of China & China Resources operated in HK, as only channel to handle financial & trade activities between China & outside world; after 1980 market reform – SOEs started subsidiaries as ‘window companies’ in HK
  • Get public on HK Stock Exchange as 1) Red Chip company (Chinese state enterprise incorporated in HK); 2) H-share company (Chinese SOE incorporated in China)
  • Dominated by utilities, energy & finance companies – 2014: over half of top H-share, red chip are banks and insurance comps (Table 24.3, p. 439)
  • e.g. China Mobile – pre-1990: fragmented provincial govt facilities; 1990s: Goldman Sachs lobbied Beijing to create consolidation of all provincial assets; 1997 IPO in HK & NY, raising US $4.5 M -> based on projected estimate of future profitability compared to existing national telecom companies elsewhere.

RMB Internationalisation

  • 2008 fear of US dollar breakdown: Chinese started planning to reduce USD reliance by campaign to internationalise use of RMB – help reducing China’s large accumulation of risky USD-denominated assets (like US Treasury bonds) in its foreign exchange
  • Full internationalisation of RMB: require China to liberalise its capital account – let go of control of banking sector & monopoly in credit creaton
  • HK’s important role: help BJ to internationalise RMB by creating a large offshore pool of freely convertible RMB in HK, while delaying liberalisation of China’s capital account
  • e.g. 2015 successful inclusion of RMB in the IMF Special Drawing Right basket of currencies (Chinese leader saw this as official endorsement of RMB being as reliable & liquid as other major reserve currencies; IMF did so to encourgae further liberalisation of China’s financial system)
  • Reason why in 2015 RMB passed the ‘freely usable currency’ test it failed in 2010 (it has to be widely used to make payments for international transactions & widely traded in the principal exchange markets): it moved up from below top 15 to being 5th most used currency in international payments (still just 2.45% share of int’l payments)
  • 70% of the 2.45% share of int’l paymens were transactions done in HK!

So

  • Internationalisation of RMB was achieved by RMB-isation of HK economy (increase in RMB deposits in HK banks, sale of RMB-denom bonds, etc.)
  • Plan for HK’s role: an offshore financial center w/ indp currency, judicial systems under Chinese sovereignty, as wholesale RMB offshore center, wiht other financial markets as retail centers

Rise of Chinese financial elites in HK:

  • Hua Jing Society (香港華菁會) founded by Fang Fang (former Chief Executive of JP Morgan in China in 2007, arrested by ICAC in 2014 after US investigation of the company’s use of illgeal connection buying)
  • Hua Jing Society was key supporter of C. Y. Leung, and many members were appointed into govt body committees, like Central Policy Unit, Commission of Strategic Development of the HKSAR govt (策略發展委員會)chaired by the CE of HK alongisde all major govt officials; Financial Services Development Council set up by HK govt in 2013 –
  • helped pushing central govt agendas like One Belt One Road

Overall msg: HK’s role as China’s offshore economy will only strengths, not being weakened

Author: Veronique

To be tenacious, patient and independent.

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out /  Change )

Google photo

You are commenting using your Google account. Log Out /  Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out /  Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out /  Change )

Connecting to %s

Create your website with WordPress.com
Get started
%d bloggers like this: